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Abstract
Cognition is the process of knowing. As carried out by a dynamical
system, it is the process by which the system absorbs information into its
state. A complex network of agents cognizes knowledge about its environ-
ment, internal dynamics and initial state by forming emergent, macro-level
patterns. Such patterns require each agent to find its place while partially
aware of the whole pattern. Such partial awareness can be achieved by sep-
arating the system dynamics into two parts by timescale: the propagation
dynamics and the pattern dynamics. The fast propagation dynamics describe
the spread of signals across the network. If they converge to a fixed point for
any quasi-static state of the slow pattern dynamics, that fixed point repre-
sents an aggregate of macro-level information. On longer timescales, agents
coordinate via positive feedback to form patterns, which are defined using
closed walks in the graph of agents. Patterns can be coherent, in that every
part of the pattern depends on every other part for context. Coherent pat-
terns are acausal, in that a) they cannot be predicted and b) no part of the
stored knowledge can be mapped to any part of the pattern, or vice versa.
A cognitive network’s knowledge is encoded or embodied by the selection of
patterns which emerge. The theory of cognition summarized here can model
autocatalytic reaction-diffusion systems, artificial neural networks, market
economies and ant colony optimization, among many other real and virtual
systems. This theory suggests a new understanding of complexity as a lattice
of contexts rather than a single measure.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Ants are both familiar and mysterious. You can find a colony almost
anywhere, but how do they dig such intricate tunnels, forage as a group and
wage war? How do they decide which of these they should all be doing,
when each ant - including the queen - is quite stupid? Ants signal each
other by touch, sound and pheremone, and these signals coordinate them in
ways no individual ant could fathom. The signals propagate from ant to ant,
inhibiting, modifying, amplifying and directing each other so that the ants,
in obeying them, act for the colony’s good.
This complexity would not be necessary in a simple or isolated en-
vironment. A colony must simultaneously find enough food, secure its nest
against predators, dispose of waste and care for its young. Despite their caste
system most ants perform many tasks. A worker may retrieve some food,
store it, repair a collapsed tunnel, then go back to harvesting food. Each ac-
tion is a response to stimulus from the environment and from other ants. An
ant that signaled for more food may become sidetracked to help the queen
brood, but the hunger signal remains and propagates to other ants, some of
whom respond. The colony as a whole constantly responds to myriad stimuli,
allocating resources and collectively making decisions.
Asked to explain this collective cognition, you could point to evolu-
tion by natural selection. Every generation, each ant’s response to stimulus
changed slightly, which tweaked the collective behavior. Successful tweaks
survived, and ant societies grew more complex. But this story tells us little
about how each ant colony reacts to its environment. How do those entan-
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gled patterns of signaling bridge environmental stimulus to colony survival?
How might they be engineered?
Cognition is the process of knowing.
While cognition commonly refers only to human thought, this definition
comes from cybernetics. For a dynamical system to know, information must
be encoded in its state. That information may come from the environment
or quirks of the system’s own nature.
A system cognizes when it absorbes information, internal or
external, into its state.
To store any significant amount of information, the system must have
a very “large” state space. Real numbers can technically hold an arbitrary
amount of information, and the theory of dynamical systems whose state
are vectors of reals is well-developed. Could we use that theory to describe
cognition? Unfortunately, no. To store a message, the system must find
a corresponding region of its state space and remain there. The system’s
dynamics function as an encoder of the message. To increase the size of the
message, a state space would need to be split into increasingly small stable
regions, and the dynamics would become increasingly difficult to analyze.
Furthermore, each such region would border on a limited number of others,
making it hard for the system to encode an arbitrary message starting from
arbitrary initial conditions.1
Alternatively, we can increase the dimensionality of the state space.
To keep the dynamics tractable, we need to restrict the ways in which the
state variables affect each other. Complex networks fit the bill. The state
space of a complex network has an arbitrary number of dimensions, and each
agent affects only itself and its neighbors. Certain complex networks are
already known to absorb information from their environment.2 All living
systems are complex networks, as are some nonliving systems.
A complex network is a system of agents that selectively inter-
act with each other in ways that are hard to understand solely
from knowledge of the individual agents.
1If the system starts with no prior information about the message, the initial conditions
will certainly be arbitrary.
2This is usually described as acquiring order from the environment.
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An agent is an indivisible entity which acts of its own accord.
If it was not already clear, I will not investigate ant colonies in par-
ticular. Instead, I will look at an entire class of complex networks - to which
ant colonies belong - that produce unpredictable but stable and coherent
patterns. Each of these words - unpredictable, stable, coherent - is both vi-
tal and frustratingly vague. If the patterns were predictable, we would have
no use for the complex system. If the system did not find a stable region of
its state space, then it cannot store information. And to store a single large
message rather than many unrelated and trivial messages, agents must spe-
cialize and coordinate - even though each agent cannot directly affect most
others.
A pattern is coherent if each part of it depends on the rest.
Unfortunately, no mathematics exist that describe pattern or stability
in a complex system.[13] Without such mathematics, any reasoning about
complex systems will be as fuzzy as the words I defined in the last paragraph.
I will articulate, in this thesis, mathematics that underpin cognition. These
mathematics could be used to:
• control large distributed systems like smart grids and reconfigurable
factories
• solve hard optimization problems and automate engineering design
• coordinate and plan complicated robotic motions
The mathematics of cognition will be necessary - though likely not suffi-
cient - for growing strong artificial intelligence. We may also come to better
understand natural systems like market economies and ecosystems. That un-
derstanding could help us to develop better public policy and safely manage
the environment. And there are many other ways to apply cognition; I am
sure that I will never see them all.
The next two chapters will construct this new theory. I will begin with
the interactions between agents, studying the way information propagates
across a network. Then, in Chapter 3, I will set forth how agents coordinate
and form patterns through the use of positive feedback. In Chapter 4, I
will apply the mathematics of the first two chapters to a set of more concrete
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models. My goal is a set of abstractions that explain a wide range of concrete
cognitive systems.
In my last chapter, I will examine why I chose those abstractions and
not others. The concept of context will prove to be a strong guiding principle.
It may seem, by the end, that I present some of this material out of order. I
do apologize for any difficulties in understanding my text, but we are all at
the mercy of cognition itself. It emerges whole, of its own accord.
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Chapter 2
Signal Propagation
This chapter will describe how information propagates across a com-
plex network. By the end, I will have explained how agents gain access to
macro-level information through the aggregations each agent performs for its
neighbors.
2.1 A Naive Approach
The standard model of a complex network is a directed graph G =
(V,E) where the vertices V are the agents. For convenience, I will define two
functions, T (v) = {(v′, v) : (v′, v) ∈ E} and F (v) = {(v′, v) : (v′, v) ∈ E},
to give the arcs incident to and incident from agent v, respectively. If there
is no chance of ambiguity, these can be written Tv and Fv. The state of
each agent v is governed by some function ψtv. The graph specifies which
agents directly affect the state of which others; the state of agent v depends
on the state of agent v′ if and only if (v′, v) ∈ E. This means that if time is
discrete (t ∈ Z), then ψ1v maps the states of agents {v} ∩ Tv to the state of
agent v, and if time is continuous (t ∈ R), then dψv/dt is a function of those
same agent states. By changing their states over time and influencing their
neighbors, agents are said to act per their definition.
For agents to coordinate with each other, they must exchange informa-
tion. Unfortunately, we cannot study solely how information spreads across
the network, because the standard model ties up that spread with changes
in agent state. To separate the two, I will complicate the model slightly.
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Figure 2.1: A directed graph. As an example of my notation, Tb =
{(a, b), (d, b)} and Fb = {(b, c), (b, d)}.
A signal is the action of one agent on another.
Let every signal be a point in X . The signal xe ∈ X moves across arc e ∈ E.
The vector of signals in a set of arcs A ⊆ E is a point xA ∈ X
|A|, the | · |
notation being the cardinality of A. I will use different subscripts on the
same variable to select subvectors, so xA is a subvector of xE ∈ X
|E|, and
zA is a subvector of zE ∈ X
|E|. Agent v’s state now depends the signals xTv
rather than the states of agents in v′ : (v′, v) ∈ Tv. I will take the unusual
step of identifying each agent’s state with a function that maps input signals
to output signals.
fv : X
|Tv| 7→ X |Fv| fv ∈ Fv (2.1)
Fv is the state space through which each agent v moves. Having now adjusted
the standard model, how do agents exchange information?
I will briefly take the role of a single agent. If I am to join a coherent
pattern, I must coordinate with other agents to which I am not necessarily
adjacent. But I am only a simple agent, so my state cannot specifically reflect
these distant agents.1 Any information I exchange with distant agents must
therefore flow through my neighbors. I can tell my neighbors apart, but there
is no way to know the ultimate source of their information - or for them to
1I use “simple” here in a very narrow sense. An agent can itself be complex, but by
this assumption it cannot cognize the whole network of which it is a part.
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know the ultimate destination of mine. Nonetheless the information channel
between me and any distant agent consists of chains of adjacent agents. All
agents constantly move, which changes the way they direct my signals. By
the time my signal reaches a distant agent, and that agent responds, the
information channel between us has changed in response to other signals as
well as its own collective state. My state has changed too, for that matter.
You might argue that agent movements in and of themselves do not
doom my communication with the distant agent. If agents move cyclically,
then I may be able to sychronize to some extent with that distant agent.
But if agents only move in cycles, the whole network will simply vibrate
indefinitely, making no progress towards a coherent pattern. Insofar as a
cycle is steady, it amounts to a fixed state. And if the cycle changes over
time (again at a rate similar to that of signal travel), then our information
channel again loses integrity.
So coordinating with distant agents seems unlikely. But how then can
they form the coherent patterns necessary to store large messages?
2.2 Propagation Dynamics
To foster coherent patterns, let us try slowing down agent movement
to the point where they are quasi-static on signaling timescales. Each agent,
if its function is fixed, simply maps input signals to output signals. Our single
complex system is now two interrelated systems: one for the propagation of
signals across the network and one for changes in agent state. For brevity,
let FV =
∏
v∈V Fv. A point fV ∈ FV is a vector of functions fv for every
agent v ∈ V . Similar to the convention of signal notation, fv is a component
of fV , and gv is a component of gV .
Definition 2.1. The propagation dynamics on G = (V,E) are a flow (or
an iterated function) Γt : FV × X
|E| 7→ X |E| parameterized by the agent
functions fV . A point zE is a fixed point of the propagation dynamics only
if zFv = fv(zTv) for all agents v ∈ V .
The propagation dynamics define the way information spreads across
the network. Usually they are stochastic and discrete, although as you will see
in Chapter 4, the propagation dynamics can be stochastic or deterministic,
discrete or continuous.
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Our second system - the slow counterpart to the propagation dynamics
- describes the emergence of patterns. To limit the speed of agent motion,
there must be a metric on Fv. I will call it dv.
Definition 2.2. The pattern dynamics on G = (V,E) are a continuous
flow ψtV : FV 7→ FV that describes the motion of every agent function over
time, starting from any point in FV . The motion of a single agent v is
denoted ψtv and is Lipschitz continuous (with a Lipschitz constant L ≥ 0):
dv
(
fv, ψ
t
v(fv)
)
≤ L|t| t ∈ R, ∀fv ∈ Fv, ∀v ∈ V (2.2)
An agent’s motion at any instant is determined only by its current state and
the signals it receives.
I would like to make the last statement in that definition more formal,
but I cannot do so quite yet. If ψv were differentiable, then its time derivative
would be a function of the current fv and current xTv. Unfortunately, re-
quiring differentiability would cripple a theory of cognition; there are many
cognitive networks with non-differentiable states. I will discuss several of
them in Chapter 4. For now, think of each continuous agent flow ψv as ap-
proximated by an iterated function of the current state fv and the current
input signals xTv, where each iteration moves the agent infintesimally.
The propagation and pattern dynamics must be kept separate. But
what does this mean? Say that the propagation dynamics always converge
to a fixed point. According to Definition 2.1, the fixed point depends on
the agent functions. Let p : FV 7→ X
|E| map the agent functions to a fixed
point of the corresponding propagation dynamics. As the pattern dynamics
progress, the fixed point of the propagation dynamics would move. To be
separate from the pattern dynamics, the propagation dynamics should stay
arbitrarily close to their fixed point. That way, each agent v will change its
state as a function of p(fV )Tv.
“Closeness” implies metric on X |E|. Let (X, ρ) be a complete metric
space and A ⊆ E. Define a metric ρA(xA, yA) =
∑
e∈A ρ(xe, ye) on X
|A|.
(X |E|, ρE) is also a complete metric space.
2 Resist the temptation to think
of signals as real numbers. This interpretation is quite limiting, as you will
see in Chapter 4. A better interpretation of signals is as measureable sets of
stimuli. If µ : X 7→ [0,∞) is the measure and △ is the symmetric difference,
then ρ(x, y) = µ(x△y).
2I have chosen the L1 norm to combine vectors of signals, but there are other options.
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Definition 2.3. At time t = 0, let xE be the state of the propagation
dynamics and fV be the state of the pattern dynamics. The pattern dynamics
are separated from the propagation dynamics at time t if there exists an
arbitrarily small ǫ > 0 such that:
ρE
(
Γt
(
ψtV (fV ), xE
)
, p
(
ψtV (fV )
))
≤ ǫ (2.3)
Agent states map to signals via p, which in turn determine how those
agent states change over time. I will provide an example proof of separation
in Section 2.4.
The propagation dynamics, separated from the pattern dynamics,
solve a major standing problem in complex systems. Emergence is gener-
ally agreed to come from feedback loops between the micro and macro levels
of a complex system[3], but most models have trouble conveying macro-
level information to individual agents. They mostly choose between two
approaches.3 The first - taken by cellular automata - is to let information
percolate on its own. As we saw in Section 2.1, this is no different from
ignoring the problem and hoping for a miracle.
The second approach is to compute a single, crude aggregate of all the
agent states and make that single aggregate available to every agent. These
crude aggregations force a tradeoff between agent complexity and pattern
coherence. On one end of the scale, the crude aggregate perfectly summarizes
the state of the whole system. Each supposedly simple agent must then be
complex enough to parse this information and understand its part in the
pattern - a clear contradiction. Multi-agent systems usually operate at or
near this extreme. On the other end of the scale, the aggregate contains
no useful information about macro-level pattern. Without it, agents cannot
specialize. Without specialization, a pattern cannot be coherent. Agent-
based models often use these uninformative aggregations.
Propagation dynamics sidestep the complexity/coherence tradeoff by
distributing the work of aggregation. Each agent aggregates information for
its neighbors. This concept is not new; Freidrich Hayek had noticed by 1945
that actors in a market aggregate information about the scarcity of each
product by setting prices.[7] To know how much of a good to make, the
producers of that good need not trace all the ways in which it is used or
3The few exceptions - artifical neural networks come to mind - invariably mimic specific
natural systems. No one has explained precisely why they work.
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transformed by the rest of the economy; they need only observe changes in
price. Likewise to know how much of each good to use, consumers need not
keep track of improvements or disruptions in every supply chain. No human
could ever be fully aware of all the decisions made in the economy, yet those
decisions cohere.
Definition 2.4. The aggregate of the graph G and agent states fV is given
by a function p : FV 7→ X
|E| such that p(fV ) is always a fixed point of the
propagation dynamics on G. The function p is the aggregation.
In the course of modeling any particular cognitive network, it’s natural
to ask which information propagates and which doesn’t. To keep my theory
as general as possible, I have avoided this question and tried not to assume
anything about the answer.
2.3 Existence of an Aggregation
The aggregation p only exists if the propagation dynamics always have
a stable fixed point, preferably a unique one. Any proof of convergence to
a fixed point will depend on the particular application of this theory. This
section contains two simple examples.
Consider first the following propagation dynamics: every agent v, si-
multaneously and at intervals in time, applies fv to its inputs xTv and updates
its outputs xFv with the result.
Γ1(fV , xE) =
(
fv(xTv)
)
v∈V
(2.4)
Definition 2.5. Let α ∈ (0, 1) and xTv, yTv ∈ X
|Tv|. An agent function fv
contracts if:
αρTv(xTv, yTv) ≥ ρFv
(
fv(xTv), fv(yTv)
)
(2.5)
Theorem 2.1. If every agent function contracts, then the propagation dy-
namics defined by Equation 2.4 converge exponentially to unique fixed point.
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Proof.
ρE(Γ
1(fV , xE),Γ
1(fV , yE)) =
∑
e∈E
ρ
(
Γ1(fV , xE)e,Γ
1(fV , yE)e
)
=
∑
v∈V
∑
j∈Fv
ρ
(
fv(xTv)j , fv(yTv)j
)
=
∑
v∈V
ρFv
(
fv(xTv), fv(yTv)
)
≤
∑
v∈V
αρTv(xTv, yTv)
ρE
(
Γ1(fV , xE),Γ
1(fV , yE)
)
≤ αρE(xE , yE) (2.6)
Γ1 is a contraction mapping. All contraction mappings converge exponen-
tially to a unique fixed point.
Updating all agents simultaneously requires the agents to synchronize,
which - according to my assumption that agents only coordinate via signals
- they are unable to do unless the propagation dynamics converge. The
synchronous propagation dynamics in Equation 2.4 are physically unlikely.
Consider now the propagation dynamics in which each agent updates
randomly according to a Poisson process in time. The Poisson processes are
independent and identically distributed with a rate λ. These asynchronous
propagation dynamics Λ are a jump process on X |E| whose jumps are them-
selves Poisson-distributed in time, albeit with a much faster rate than λ.
Letting xA‖xB = xA∪B concatenate two vectors indexed by disjoint sets A
and B, each jump moves xE to xE−Fv‖fv(xTv) for a randomly drawn agent
v.
Theorem 2.2. If every agent function contracts, Λ contracts to a unique
fixed point.
Proof. Since Γ has only one fixed point zE , then by Definition 2.1 so does Λ
have the same fixed point. Let the interval [a, b) be an interval in time over
which every agent has updated at least once. The expected length of this
interval can be derived from the Poisson distribution.
1/2 = (1− P (N(b− a) = 0))|V |
1/2 = (1− e−λ(b−a))|V |
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E(b− a) = −
1
λ
ln(1− 2−1/|V |) (2.7)
Because this interval grows only logarithmically with the number of agents,
the number of agents matters little. The actual size of each interval has a
probability distribution, but the law of large numbers asserts that the time-
average of interval lengths gets arbitrarily close to the expectation of that
length as time goes on.
The propagation dynamics contract at least as much over the interval
[a, b) as they would in one synchronous update. The distance between the
trajectories from xE and yE over time is therefore bounded from above by
an exponential decay.
αt/(b−a)ρE(xE , yE) ≥ ρE
(
Λt(fV , xE),Λ
t(fV , yE)
)
(2.8)
Having shown that aggregations exist for propagation dynamics Γ and
Λ, I now ask: How complete is the aggregate? For two distant agents to co-
ordinate, the aggregate available to each must be sensitive to the state of
the other. In other words, the signals available to each agent should include
at least some information about every other agent. Given the restriction on
fixed points in Definition 2.1, this property depends only on the agent func-
tions (and the graph) rather than propagation dynamics they parameterize.
I can see two scenarios in which information fails to spread properly.
If the graph grows too large and sparse, the shortest path between
a pair of agents can grow arbitrarily long. Agent contraction does not just
bound the time in which signals converge, it also limits how far they can
spread through the graph. Agents can (and usually will) prioritize certain
signals over others, which will cause the former to propagate further than
the latter. Nevertheless, contractive agents cannot pass on more than a
fraction of the signals they receive. Over a long enough path, even the
strongest and most important of signals must fade. One solution is to give
large networks the small-world property4, thereby putting an upper bound
on the shortest path between any two agents. Another solution is to relax
the rate of convergence from exponential to asymptotic.
4in which the number of arcs to and from any particular agent has a geometric prob-
ability distribution. In simple terms: while most agents have relatively few arcs, a few
agents have many, and a very few have a huge number.
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Signals can also fail to propagate if agents direct them based not on
their content but on their origin. Obviously a closed community of agents -
one with no arcs to the rest of the graph - will never send any signals to the
rest of the graph. The same thing can happen without an explicitly closed
community if agents make some of their output signals insensitive to changes
in their input signals. While this behavior can sometimes be desireable, a
“virtual” community of agents whose signals to the rest of the network are all
insensitive to changes within the community is no different from an explictly
closed community.
2.4 Separating Propagation from Pattern
I defined separation in Definition 2.3 as the propagation dynamics
staying close to an aggregate as that aggregate moves in response to the
pattern dynamics. In this section, I will discuss how stability of the propa-
gation dynamics together with Lipschitz continuity of the pattern dynamics
can maintain separation.
The aggregate should not move too fast, compared to the rate at
which the propagation dynamics converge. I will use a differentiable and
decreasing function of time φ : [0,∞) 7→ [0, 1] to characterize the rate at
which the propagation dynamics converge.
φ(t)ρE(xE , p(fV )) ≥ ρE(Γ
t(fV , xE), p(fV )) t ≥ 0 (2.9)
Because Γ0(fV , xE) = xE , φ(0) = 1. If the propagation dynamics are asymp-
totically stable, then limt→∞ φ(t) = 0.
Since Definition 2.2 limits the speed at which the agent functions fV
move, the aggregation should also be Lipschitz continuous. Having supposed
a metric dv on Fv in Section 2.2, I will use the average of those distances as
a metric on FV .
dV (fV , gV ) =
1
|V |
∑
v∈V
dv(fv, gv) (2.10)
This particular dV will make Theorem 2.3 slightly easier to prove, but there
are other viable choices. As far as dv is concerned, a natural choice is:
dv(fv, gv) = sup
xTv
ρFv
(
fv(xTv), gv(xTv)
)
(2.11)
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Theorem 2.3. Let the aggregate p(fV ) = zE. The aggregation p is Lipschitz
continuous if there exists an M > 0 such that:
M(1− φ(t)) dV (fV , f
′
V ) ≥ ρE
(
zE ,Γ
t (f ′V , zE)
)
t ≥ 0 (2.12)
Proof. Let z′E = p(f
′
V ). Starting from the triangle inequality:
ρE
(
zE ,Γ
t(f ′V , zE)
)
+ ρE
(
Γt(f ′V , zE), z
′
E
)
≥ ρE
(
zE , z
′
E
)
M(1 − φ(t)) dV (fV , f
′
V ) + φ(t)ρE(zE , z
′
E) ≥ ρE(zE , z
′
E) t ≥ 0 (2.13)
This inequality is satisfied trivially at φ(0) = 1. At all other points in time,
M dV (fV , f
′
V ) ≥ ρE(zE, z
′
E)
M dV (fV , f
′
V ) ≥ ρE
(
p(fV ), p(f
′
V )
)
(2.14)
Equation 2.12 limits the rate at which the propagation dynamics, after
a change in the agent functions, can diverge from the previous fixed point.
Equation 2.13 pits this rate against the rate of convergence. It should not
actually be necessary for these two rates to cancel out, so long as the rate of
convergence exceeds the rate of divergence.
Theorem 2.4. If the aggregate p is Lipschitz continuous and Equation 2.9
holds, there exists some t′ > 0 such that Γ and ψV are separate for all t > t
′.
Proof. Let xE , fV be the state of the cognitive network at t = 0, so zE =
p(fV ) is the initial aggregate. Given some small δ > 0, let x
′
E = Γ
δ(fV , xE)
and z′E = p(ψ
δ
V (fV )). Starting again from a triangle inequality:
ρE(x
′
E , zE) + ρE(zE, z
′
E) ≥ ρE(x
′
E , z
′
E)
φ(δ)ρE(xE , zE) +MLδ ≥ ρE(x
′
E , z
′
E) (2.15)
φ(δ) +
MLδ
ρE(xE , zE)
≥
ρE(x
′
E , z
′
E)
ρE(xE , zE)
(2.16)
If the right-hand side of Equation 2.16 is greater than one, the signals
get further away from the aggregate over the interval δ. Less than one, and
they get closer. If ρE(xE , zE) = ǫ/2 and the right-hand side is one, then:
1
2
ǫ = lim
δ→0
MLδ
1− φ(δ)
(2.17)
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We can ensure this limit exists by requiring that:
d
dt
MLt ≤
d
dt
(1− φ(t)) t ∈ [0, δ]
ML ≤ −
dφ
dt
t ∈ [0, δ] (2.18)
By decreasing L further, we can make ǫ arbitrarily small.
Equation 2.15 describes a single step through time. If ρ(xE , zE) > ǫ/2,
then the signals Γδ(fV , xE) step closer to p(ψ
δ
V (fV )). Adding more steps and
taking the limit as δ → 0, the signals will approach the (ǫ/2)-ball around the
aggregate. At some finite time t′ they will be within ǫ of the aggregate, and
they will never leave that ǫ-ball.
ρE
(
Γt
(
ψtV (fV ), xE
)
, p
(
ψtV (fV )
))
≤ ǫ t > t′
As long as the propagation and pattern dynamics are separated, agent
v reacts only to p(ψtV (fV ))Tv, or at least to arbitrarily similar signals. If we
let ǫ grow, ψV will become stochastic; the propagation dynamics are often
stochastic themselves, and there is no way for an agent to know where in the
ǫ-ball the aggregate actually is. It will react to whatever signals it sees.
In fact, the fixed point of propagation dynamics need not be unique.
As long as the propagation dynamics stay near one of the fixed points and
the fixed points don’t pass within 2ǫ of each other, then the system’s choice of
a fixed point is unambiguous, and the aggregation is well-defined. The price
we would pay for the extra flexibility is hysteresis in the pattern dynamics.
If multiple fixed points exist, then there is no way to know which one the
system will choose without knowing which fixed point it has chosen in the
past.
The separation proof can also help us to simulate cognitive networks
with a computer. The constants M and L along with the convergence func-
tion φ imply an upper limit on the time step δ, beyond which Equation 2.18
no longer holds.
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2.5 Retrospective on Propagation
We started with a goal: to design dynamical systems that cognize -
that perform the process of knowing. A cognitive system, simply by obeying
its own dynamics, absorbs information and stores that information in its
state. We focused on complex networks because their state space has many
dimensions, and high-dimensional spaces can store more information. But to
make full use of that state space, the agents in the network must coordinate
with distant counterparts and specialize.
This is quite difficult, because an agent cannot be explicitly aware
of any other agents with which it does not share an arc. Agents may only
communicate through other agents. Any change in the agents thus alters
their communication channels.
To keep those communication channels stable, we slowed down
changes in agent state, giving the propagation dynamics time to converge
to a fixed point. Each component of that fixed point is a signal traveling
over an arc in the directed graph. That single signal can reflect, to varying
degrees, the state of every agent. Because the propagation dynamics are
parameterized by the agent states, the fixed point moves as the agents do,
and the propagation dynamics never quite reach it. But the closer they are
to their fixed point, the more certain each agent is about the information it
receives. Therefore the slower the agents move relative to the propagation
dynamics, the more deterministic the agents’ motion.
Although each signal goes from one agent to another, the communi-
cation between agents is many-to-many rather than one-to-one. Every agent
sees a few components of the aggregate, as produced by its neighbors. These
were in turn produced from other components of the aggregate, as produced
by their neighbors. The propagation dynamics are the process of aggregation
- the process by which the micro level becomes aware of the macro level.
I identify cognition with the emergence of patterns, and the emergence
of patterns is widely identified with feedback between the micro and macro
levels of a complex network[3]. I have managed to explicitly link the micro
level to the macro level - one half of the required feedback process. To my
knowledge, this has never been done before with simple agents and without
any omniscient view of the network.
As the agents move in response to that aggregate (at least the com-
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ponents they can see), the aggregate responds to their motion in turn. The
conditions for distributed aggregation are few and broad. They come in two
classes, which I call primary and secondary. Primary conditions must apply
to any network, regardless of the fixed point proof used for the propagation
dynamics.
• Agents must be quasi-static on the signaling timescale. (L is small.)
• Signals must have a metric (ρ).
• The propagation dynamics must converge. (At least as fast as φ.)
• The propagation dynamics Γt(gV , p(fV )) must not diverge too quickly
from p(fV ). (Equation 2.12)
The first two conditions apply to the micro-level, which makes them easy to
enforce. While the particular reasons vary from field to field, the heart of
the matter is that macro-level behavior is difficult to understand or control.
To try is usually to fail or to diminish the network’s cognitive ability. For
instance, what if I were to stipulate that the propagation dynamics contract
without requiring that each agent contract? Some agents would be allowed
an α ≥ 1, but which ones? It would only take two (mutually adjacent) ex-
pansive agents to prevent convergence. Such a scheme is not impossible - the
agents could coordinate their contraction or expansion as part of the pattern
dynamics. But it would be much more difficult to analyze and control.
The second two primary conditions avoid this difficulty through the
use of abstraction. They are metaconditions - conditions about conditions.
Any concrete model of cognition will add its own set of conditions - the
secondary conditions. To give an example, the proofs in Section 2.3 both
require that each agent contract individually. That secondary condition need
not hold for every cognitive network; the proof of a metacondition can differ
for every application.
There is another metacondition hidden in Definition 2.1: the require-
ment that, at a fixed point zE of Γt(fV , ·), zFv = fv(zTv) for every agent v. It
means that the set of potential fixed points is determined on the micro level;
the propagation dynamics - a macro phenomenon - only select a fixed point
from that set. The two versions of the propagation dynamics in Section 2.3
(Γ1 and Λt) actually have the same fixed points.
The three metaconditions I’ve created so far are relatively easy to
tackle because they only restrict the propagation dynamics. Because the
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propagation dynamics are often specific to a problem domain anyway, the
secondary conditions necessary in the special case sacrifice no descriptive
power or ease of application in the general case. I have striven to keep
the my primary conditions as few and as broad as possible. The agents,
for example, are still black boxes. Their state is not parameterized, which
frees us to use nearly any parameterization we like. They need not even
be uniform. Another example are the signals, which only need a notion of
distance.
Most study of complex networks centers on the agents, trying to an-
swer questions like: What do they do? How do they interact? My theory
shifts focus away from the agents and toward their signals: How do signals
propagate? What information do they carry? Aggregation (as in Definition
2.4) creates a many-to-many communications channel, and Section 2.4 veri-
fies that channel’s integrity. That still leaves us asking what information it
conveys. There are as many answers to this question as there are problem
domains, but many domains have commonalities. For example, an agent
that can be connected to an arbitrary number of others must combine an
arbitrary number of signals. A natural way to do this would be to recur-
sively fold pairs of signals together - to give them algebraic structure. Signal
algebras could help determine which information spreads across the network
and which does not.
In addition to shifting focus from agents to signals, I have also changed
my view of - for lack of a word - that which cognizes. Artificial intelligence
researchers usually try to create cognitive algorithms. Creating an algorithm
means breaking down a task or process into discrete steps which mostly occur
in linear order. Aside from the fact that writing a cognitive algorithm has
proven to be quite a nasty problem, this approach fosters bad habits of mind.
Because the default point of view is omniscient, we rarely ask key questions
about information - how it spreads, how it’s stored, where it gets used. We
get used to thinking about information in discrete, hierarchically-organized
packets rather than in diffuse gestalts.
Instead of writing cognitive algorithms, I am designing cognitive dy-
namical systems. That means accounting for any transmission of information
via signaling and limiting each agent’s use of information. It also creates more
questions: How do states affect each others’ motion? Can the system’s dy-
namics lead to gestalt configurations of state? When are those configurations
stable? I will start to answer these questions in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
Pattern and Feedback
So now I have separated signaling (the propagation dynamics) from
the motion of agents (the pattern dynamics), and the agents have time to
collectively aggregate macro-level information. As they move, the aggrega-
tion allows them to coordinate their state, together processing information
beyond any individual agent’s capability. That information is stored in pat-
terns of agents. In this chapter I will formally define pattern in a cognitive
network, and I will explain how patterns arise from feedback between agent
state on the micro level and the aggregate on the macro level. After that,
I will discuss in broad terms how patterns relate to the information they
store.
3.1 Existing Approaches to Pattern
Patterns encode a complex network’s knowledge, and their emergence
is precisely the process of cognition. Despite their importance, most funda-
mental questions about patterns remain unanswered. When do they arise,
and when do they not? If patterns do arise, which ones? We may yet answer
these questions, but not until we know what a pattern is. I danced around
their definition in Chapter 1, when I said that patterns are large configura-
tions of agents and their relationships. These configurations, if the system is
to cognize large chunks of information, must be commensurately large, and
they must also be unpredictable, stable and coherent.
We have tried to identify the building blocks of patterns. Network
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motifs[15] are small subgraphs with fixed numbers of vertices that repeat
across the network. For a fixed n ∈ N, there are a limited number of possible
n-vertex motifs. The network motif approach starts by identifying, through
the use of statistical tests, which three-vertex motifs occur unusually often.
It then moves on to larger motifs, controlling for any smaller motifs already
found. The approach usually stops at five-vertex motifs. Networks in the
same problem domain exhibit similar motifs, which can teach us about the
style of patterns in that problem domain. But if all networks in a domain have
the same motifs, then those motifs do not encode an individual network’s
knowledge. Rather, networks store information by combining motifs into
patterns.
It remains unclear how motifs come to be combined. It’s also not clear
that I should be asking how motifs combine instead of asking how agents
combine. To ask how patterns form is to ask how an agent coordinates with
distant neighbors of whom it cannot be aware. I could allow agents to know
the motifs of which they are a part - relaxing my simplicity axiom - but I
could not explain how motifs coordinate without being aware of each other
any more than I could explain how agents do the same. Furthermore, because
I am not working within any particular problem domain, I know less about
individual motifs than I know about individual agents. I conclude that while
motifs are a useful tool on the micro-level, shifting focus from agents to motifs
would add complication without answering my fundamental questions about
cognition and pattern emergence.
Another approach is to form patterns by explicit consensus1 of the
constituent agents. There is a large body of work on consensus networks,
ably reviewed in [17]. The consensus definition of consensus is “to reach an
agreement regarding a certain quantity of interest that depends on the state
of all agents.” This usually means that “the state of all agents asymptotically
be[comes] the same.” To the degree that agent states do not become the
same, they do not consense. A pattern does not follow automatically from
consensus, but the agents can agree on a pattern to form together. In this
case, the state they agree on must be sufficient to select and describe that
pattern. Because each agent must store this state, we arrive back at a tradeoff
similar to the one I described in Section 2.2.
1Any kind of pattern will constitute at least an implicit consensus.
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That tradeoff pitted the simplicity2 of the agents against their need for
macro-level information. I resolved it by using the propagation dynamics to
compute an aggregate, thereby distributing the work of aggregation among all
the agents. Consensus networks fail to distribute the storage of information
among all the agents, which pits the simplicity of the agents against the
network’s ability to store information. In other words, consensus networks
must trade off agent simplicity against the network’s cognitive ability. An
agent that can - by itself - describe large, coherent patterns is no longer simple
relative to the network. Thus consensus and coherence are at odds, and we
find ourselves trading off agent simplicity against the scope and coherence of
pattern.
I seek to sidestep this tradeoff as I did the last... or to sidestep the
same tradeoff again. Are these tradeoffs distinct, or are they aspects of the
same fundamental paradox?
3.2 Feedback Loops
It is generally agreed that patterns in a complex network emerge as
feedback loops between micro and macro behavior[3]. But what is a “feed-
back loop between micro and macro behavior”? In a cognitive network,
the agents (micro level components) collectively compute an aggregate (at
the macro level), which in turn determines agent motion (on the micro level).
That interplay creates the possibility for micro-macro feedback, but it doesn’t
guarantee that feedback occurs. What would make that guarantee?
I will start with a pair of agents u, v ∈ V . Each agent has an arc to
the other - (u, v), (v, u) ∈ E. If they coordinate, then z(u,v) should reinforce
z(v,u) and vice versa.
3 Reinforcement suggests at least a partial ordering of
signals, which I will denote with “≺”.4 This ordering may vary according to
the micro-level context.
Mutual reinforcement also suggests causality. An increase in z(u,v)
should cause agent v to change its function fv in a way that increases z(v,u).
2Narrowly: relative to the network as a whole.
3I’m using z rather than x to remind you that agents react the aggregate.
4If you’re still thinking about signals as measureable sets like I suggested in Section
2.2, then perhaps for x, y ∈ X , x ≺ y if and only if x ⊂ y. A stronger ordering might be
x ≺ y ⇐⇒ µ(x) < µ(y).
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The converse should also be true. I will treat each agent v as a greedy
optimizer of some real function qv : X
|Tv|+|Fv| 7→ R. For a positive δ → 0,
ψδv(fv) = argmax
f ′v∈Fv
{
qv
(
zTv, f
′
v(zTv)
)
: dv(fv, f
′
v) ≤ Lδ
}
(3.1)
You might protest that making every agent a greedy optimizer is too severe
a restriction, that it would at the very least exclude networks made up of
people. But notice that I have not defined qv. I am not choosing which
kinds of agents to analyze; I am abstracting the way any agent reacts to
its surroundings. Studying the motion of agents would normally require
calculus, which would in turn require that the state spaces Fv and X be
differentiable. As you will see in Chapter 4, differentiability really is too
restrictive. Equation 3.1 only requires that a utility function qv exist that
agent v greedily optimizes. Game theory will replace calculus.
Greedy optimization can describe a very wide variety of agents and
behaviors. Agents in a market optimize profit, for instance, and molecules
seek their lowest-energy state. Even in more complicated situations, the for-
malism can still be useful. Take the market example. A person might choose
less-profitable work because it lets him or her spend more time with fam-
ily. In that case, utility should reflect both profit and family time. Another
might sacrifice short-term earnings in exchange for long-term gains. We can
express such priorities by reformulating the signals as functions of time.5
For two agents to coordinate, their utility functions must be comple-
mentary in the game-theoretic sense. More simply: each agent must increase
the marginal gain its partner reaps by coordinating. Let xE\x
′
e = xE−{e}‖x
′
e
and more generally xA\x
′
B = xA−B‖x
′
A∩B. With that, and given a current
aggregate zE , let xE , x
′
E ∈ X
|E| such that ρE(xE , zE) < ǫ and ρE(x
′
E , zE) < ǫ,
where ǫ is the separation tolerance from Definition 2.3. If x(u,v) ≺ x
′
(u,v) and
x(v,u) ≺ x
′
(v,u),
qv
(
xTv\x
′
(u,v), xFv\x
′
(v,u)
)
− qv
(
xTv\x
′
(u,v), xFv
)
≥ qv
(
xTv, xFv\x
′
(v,u)
)
− qv
(
xTv, xFv
) (3.2)
5Computer simulation of existing cognitive networks may prove to be impractical.
There may not exist a good finite approximation of the signals, or the agents’ utility func-
tions may be impossible to observe in full. The optimization carried out by each agent
may defy our power to solve it on a large scale. This potential limitation is troubling, but
I must ignore it in order to continue.
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Figure 3.1: Feedback between agents ‘h’ and ‘f’.
qu
(
xTu\x
′
(v,u), xFu\x
′
(u,v)
)
− qu
(
xTu\x
′
(v,u), xFu
)
≥ qu
(
xTu, xFu\x
′
(u,v)
)
− qu(xTu, xFu)
(3.3)
This condition - called supermodularity - will not always lead the signals z(u,v)
and z(v,u) to both increase or both decrease. It may be that no fv ∈ Fv exists
that increases z(v,u), in which case agent v would like to continue the feedback
process but cannot. The same could also be true for agent u. Nevertheless,
supermodularity is necessary for positive feedback between our two agents.
Many pairs of agents are not mutually connected. Even if they are,
they may be involved in a larger feedback process that excludes the arcs
that connect them directly. Distant agents communicate through chains of
adjacent agents. A walk should therefore exist from each member of a pair
to its counterpart. Concatenating these walks makes a single closed walk.
Because a closed walk can start from any of its vertices and end up back where
it started, it can be expressed as a subgraph - rather than as a sequence of
alternating vertices and arcs - without losing any mathematical structure.
Thus we can say that for two agents u and v to coordinate, there must exist
some closed walk C = (VC , EC) such that u, v ∈ VC . In the case of Equations
3.2 and 3.3, VC = {u, v} and EC = {(u, v), (v, u)}.
To say that the signals between u and v reinforce each other is to say
that the signals along an entire closed walk reinforce each other. It follows
that if this pair of distant agents coordinates, so too must every agent in
some closed walk that includes the pair. That closed walk could include
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Figure 3.2: Feedback between (say) agents ‘h’ and ‘d’. Agents ‘b’, ‘c’, ‘f’ and
‘h’ are equal participants in the feedback loop.
any number of walks between u and v, so long as the entire walk keeps
reinforcing itself. In fact, C could be any strongly connected subgraph of G.
Remember that each agent v is only explicitly aware of itself and the signals
zTv. All distant agents are anonymous and also of indeterminate number
and connectivity. Therefore any feedback process between distant agents is a
micro-macro feedback loop. Patterns arise from positive feedback over closed
walks in the graph.
Definition 3.1. Let C = (VC , EC) be a closed walk in G and zE = p(fV ).
Let the pattern and propagation dynamics be separated by ǫ. Take any
xE , x
′
E ∈ X
|E| such that ρE(xE , zE) < ǫ and ρE(x
′
E , zE) < ǫ. xe ≺ x
′
e for all
e ∈ EC . C is a feedback loop if, for all v ∈ VC ,
qv
(
xTv\x
′
EC
, xFv\x
′
EC
)
− qv
(
xTv\x
′
EC
, xFv
)
≥ qv
(
xTv, xFv\x
′
EC
)
− qv(xTv, xFv)
(3.4)
Definition 3.2. A feedback loop is robust if Equation 3.4 holds for any
fV−VC ∈ FV−VC .
I define robustness here mostly to point out that the agents V − VC
can affect the feedback condition in Equation 3.4. There are likely many
degrees and kinds of robustness, but that analysis is out of my scope.
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Figure 3.3: Depending on the feedback condition for agent ‘f’, agent ‘h’ may
not be necessary to maintain feedback in the rest of the loop. The coherent
feedback loop (with ‘h’ removed) is pictured.
The union of contiguous closed walks is also a closed walk, and the
same is true for unions of contiguous feedback loops. If a feedback loop
breaks, parts of it may either remain or not.
Definition 3.3. A feedback loop is coherent if it has no subgraphs that are
feedback loops in their own right.
A feedback loop that is not coherent may include virtual communities
of the kind I mentioned briefly in Section 2.3.
Definition 3.4. A pattern is a feedback loop in which the aggregate sub-
vector zEC is Lyapunov stable.
Definition 3.4 is similar to a Nash equilibrium[6], but it does not
require the entire system to be stable. Even the agents VC in the pattern can
continue to move, so long as the aggregate zEC remains at rest. But how does
the aggregate become stable if it undergoes positive feedback? A runaway
feedback loop will not reach a steady state. The answer is to bound the image
of the aggregation p(FV ) ⊂ X
|E|. Any positive feedback loop in a compact
state space will either reach those bounds or break its own supermodularity
condition first. Since a pattern is a stable feedback loop, it must always lie
on a bound of the aggregate space. In fact, the pattern could not be stable
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FV X |E|p(FV )
p
Figure 3.4: Bounding the image of the aggregation p. Return to Section 2.2
for details about the aggregation.
without the feedback loop holding it against the boundary. The image of the
aggregation can be manipulated via the agent function spaces Fv.
3.3 Coherence and Causality
Let us return to the specifications we set for pattern in the intro-
duction: stability, coherence and unpredictability. Patterns are stable by
definition. Some are coherent. I will argue that the definition of coherence
in Section 3.2 is a good one, and that coherence implies unpredictability.
If cognition is the process by which a system knows or is aware of
something, then patterns embody and encode that knowledge. I said in
Chapter 1 that a pattern is coherent if every part of it depends on the rest. By
Definitions 3.1, 3.3 and 3.4, every ze, e ∈ EC can depend in some way on every
state fv, v ∈ VC . Each agent’s role in the pattern is defined by its neighbors,
whose roles are in turn defined by their neighbors. A pattern, being a stable
configuration of agent relationships, constitutes an implicit consensus of the
agents VC . Rather than rule out explicit consensus, Definition 3.4 renders it
a trivial special case.6
6See Section 4.4 for an example.
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In general, a pattern encodes knowledge that no individual agent or
motif can. Furthermore, because no agent could produce the stable zFv∩EC
without the proper zTv∩EC , no one agent or relationship encodes any inde-
pendently useful knowledge. Instead, the smallest useful unit of knowledge
is the coherent pattern. Not all patterns are coherent; a pattern can be com-
posed of smaller, contiguous patterns. But if a pattern is coherent, then any
closed loops within it depend on the rest of the pattern in the same way that
individual agents do.
Where does the knowledge in a coherent pattern come from? I will
examine the various sources of information which a network may cognize:
initial state, the system’s own dynamics and the environment. Each of them
will influence most patterns in most networks to some degree.
The environment is the most obvious of the three influences. By the
second law of thermodynamics, no living network can subsist without draw-
ing order from its environment. Despite the close ties between a cognitive
network and its environment, I have not yet specified how the two are re-
lated. Let the graph G have at least one special vertex w, which represents
the environment rather than an agent. Any signals coming from this vertex
are said to enter the network, and any signals sent to it are said to leave the
network. In order for feedback loops including w to stabilize into patterns,
the function fw must be quasi-static on pattern timescales. Since w has no
utility function, the definition of a feedback loop must exclude it. Making the
environment quasi-static is not as restrictive as it sounds, for two reasons.
First: signals can represent probability distributions or cycles of interactions
over time. Second: feedback relations with the environment can be modeled
by simply giving w a utility function and allowing it to move, thereby folding
it into the model.
Some of a network’s knowledge comes from its own dynamics. It
will tend to form certain patterns and not others, based on the objective
functions qV and the search spaces FV . Some aspects of this style can be
captured by network motifs. Insofar as motifs are common across many
instances of a network model, they isolate style from environmental influence
or prior information. Of course the details of a network need not repeat to
be cognized - feedback loops can amplify the information available to even
one agent. These non-repeating details will not affect the network’s motifs.
Lastly, patterns can reflect the network’s initial state. They usually
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will, unless there is only one viable pattern in the whole state space. Initial
states may exist which do not lead to a pattern, even if viable patterns
exist somewhere in the state space. An engineer can prevent this case by
ensuring that the pattern dynamics are topologically mixing in the case that
no pattern arises. In the search for a pattern, the system should eventually
visit any particular region of its state space.
If a coherent pattern reflects knowledge of all three influences above
- initial state, the environment and the system’s own dynamics - then these
influences are interwoven and cannot be isolated from one another. Our
inability to correspond subsets of knowledge with subgraphs of a coherent
pattern prevents us from predicting coherent patterns. Specifically, it dis-
rupts the causal relationships between patterns (effects) and the conditions
from which they arise (causes). We cannot know which pattern will arise
from any given set of conditions, and any given feedback loop could have
begun in any number of ways. A system in which cause and effect cannot be
linked is acausal. This is curious because - assuming the pattern and prop-
agation dynamics are perfectly separated - the pattern dynamics are both
acausal and deterministic.
In Chapter 3, I have continued to shift focus away from agents and
towards signals. I defined feedback loops and patterns not in terms of the
agent states but in terms of the signals between the agents. The signals in
a pattern must be stable, yet the stability of the agents in the pattern is
unimportant in and of itself. And despite the focus on signals, my theory
derives much of its power from keeping those signals unrestricted. Formally,
they must have a metric and a partial ordering - nothing more. The partial
ordering can even be unique to each pair of agents (with only minor changes
to Section 3.2). Every concrete example in Chapter 4 will take advantage of
the flexibile definition of a signal.
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Chapter 4
Applications
This chapter will explain how various domains of study fit into our new
theory of cognition. Its purpose is to better explain cognition by providing
exemplars, rather than to learn about those exemplars per se. Most formal
proofs are also out of scope - a matter for future work. That said, I expect
that developing these applications further will bear fruit in their respective
domains.
Each section will begin with a short overview of the exemplar’s model
before drawing an analogy between that model and my theory of cognition.
I will start off with Prigogine’s dissipative structures.[18] They will help me
introduce a concept common to many applications: the two-way networks.
Unfortunately, a formal theory of two-way networks must wait for another
time.
Where dissipative structures are physical systems, cognition can also
apply to information processing. Artificial neural networks will serve as an
exemplar. They will be followed by market economies and then by ant colony
optimization. Cognition should apply naturally to ecology as well, but I know
too little of that field to make the attempt.
4.1 Dissipative Structure
As I said in Section 3.3, many cognitive networks absorb their knowl-
edge from their environment. Often, that knowledge reflects two aspects of
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the environment that are in disequilibrium, by which I mean that the en-
vironment has a high degree of order derived from the separation of those
two aspects. Knowing the disequilibrium allows the cognitive network to
alleviate it by bridging the two aspects, transporting or transforming some-
thing from one aspect to the other. That something, which I will call the
“throughput”, may be matter or or information or anything else that can be
expressed as a measurable set. Autocatalytic reaction-diffusion systems are
a simple example of a two-way network.
A reaction-diffusion system is a set of reactions occurring in a set of
places. For our purposes, each reaction in a particular place is an agent,
and sets of reactants make up the signals. The products of each reaction
either react again in the same place, diffuse to another place, or leave the
system. Alan Turing and Ilya Prigogine analyzed reaction-diffusion systems
that produce their own catalysts[19][18]. They found that when concentra-
tions of certain reactants are kept high and the concentrations of certain
products are kept low, the reaction-diffusion system produces its own cata-
lysts so as to increase the rate at which the abundant reactants are trans-
formed into the scarce products. This is autocatalysis. The newly-catalyzed
reaction produces entropy in the throughput faster than before. At the same
time, the entropy in the system’s state decreases. The second law of ther-
modynamics remains unbroken because the system produces more entropy
in the throughput than it loses by cognizing the disequilibrium. Eventually
the system stablilizes with high concentrations of the catalysts, far from the
thermodynamic equilibrium.
An autocatalytic loop is a feedback loop - a closed walk in the graph
of reactions over which an increase in each reaction’s rate causes the rate of
subsequent reactions to increase. Through these feedback loops, the reaction-
diffision system cognizes the chemical potential between certain of its original
reactants and ultimate products. When the feedback stabilizes, the system
has stored information about that chemical potential as a pattern of reactions
and the reactants they exchange.
I have just described the pattern dynamics of a reaction-diffusion sys-
tem. They looked straighforward; what then makes the reaction-diffusion
system a two-way network? The answer has to do with the flow of infor-
mation. By the law of mass action, rates of reaction depend on the concen-
trations of both reactants and products. As the reactants travel “forward”,
information about the products must travel “backward”. On fast timescales
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- while the various chemical concentrations are quasi-static - the flow of in-
formation forward and backward works itself out into deterministic rates of
reaction. The propagation dynamics are the process by which this two-way
flow stabilizes.
Let us call the space of forward signals X and the space of backward
signals Y . Each type of signal in a two-way network travels over its own
graph. The two graphs are mirror images - wherever one has an arc (u, v),
the other has an arc (v, u). The vertex set is the same for both graphs.
Because each graph implies the other, we can still talk about a single graph
G by choosing a convention. Agent functions map both kinds of inputs to
both kinds of outputs.
fv : X
|Tv| × Y |Fv| 7→ X |Fv| × Y |Tv| (4.1)
Proving that the propagation dynamics contract becomes more complicated
than in Section 2.3, and not just because both kinds of signal must converge.
Specifically, there can be no positive feedback between the two types of signal
on those timescales. Positive feedback would create acausality1 where the
fixed point of the propagation dynamics should be causal. If the relationship
between agent states fV and the signals X
|E| were acausal, the aggregation
p : FV 7→ X
|E| × Y |E| could not exist.
As I have labeled the flow of reactants as forward and the flow of
products as backward, I will label the source of reactants as the “entry” and
the sink of products as the “exit”. There is nothing special mathematically
about forward signals or backward signals; these labels are a matter of con-
vention. The entry and exit are special vertices in the graph representing the
environment. They may even be the same vertex - w - that I introduced in
Section 3.3. Like I discussed in that section, fw should not change over time.
Turing and Prigogine, in their work on what Prigogine termed dissi-
pative structures, identified some physical mechanics of cognition. But these
physical mechanics do not describe all cognitive systems. Most living things,
for instance, are cognitive networks in which each agent is itself a cognitive
network. Obviously these cannot be modeled using reaction-diffusion equa-
tions. Cognition is more an abstract pattern than a concrete phenomenon.
Turing and Prigogine’s work was also limited by the need to write
down all the equations of motion. Doing this for large networks or interlock-
1I argued in Section 3.3 that pattern emergence is acausal.
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ing feedback loops is impractical. Adrian Bejan sidestepped this limitation in
his related constructal law[2], but he substituted another: constructal theory
is limited to trees (as opposed to graphs). Bejan’s theory was also limited
by its lack of formality.
4.2 Artificial Neural Networks
Artificial neural networks are a computational and mathematical ab-
straction of biological neurons[1]. The “neurons” are arranged in a directed
graph. At any particular time, every neuron is either firing or inactive. It ac-
tivates if the weighted sum of other neurons’ activity passes a threshold[14].
Let x ∈ X = {0, 1}M be a neuron’s firing activity for M data points. For an
agent v with a bias bv and a weight w for every input link,
xj = H
(
bv +
∑
i∈Tv
wixi
)
j ∈ Fv (4.2)
where H is the Heaviside step function. To use an artificial neural network,
one sets the firing activity of a subset of neurons (called the input neurons),
waits for changes in firing activity to propagate through the network and,
finally, reads the firing activity of another subset of neurons (the output
neurons). The mapping between input and output for the network is thus
determined by:
• the graph
• the weights of connections between neurons
• the neuron biases
• the sequence in which neurons update their firing activity
Researchers have studied many, many ways to connect the neurons, sequence
their updates and train the weights and biases. The most popular schemes
find ways to serialize the process (making the computation easier) and keep
it predictable.
One such scheme is the multilayer perceptron with “vanilla” backprop-
agation. This scheme is a two-way cognitive network in which the neurons
are agents. In a multilayer perceptron, the neurons are arranged in K layers,
where Lk ⊂ V for each k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. The input neurons L1 are the entry
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vertices. To fit my model, an exit vertex v′ must be added to the perceptron;
that exit vertex has one arc from each neuron in the output layer LK .
V =
(⋃
k≤K
Lk
)
∪ {v′} (4.3)
E =
(⋃
k<K
{(u, v) : u ∈ Lk, v ∈ Lk+1}
)
∪ {(u, v′) : u ∈ LK} (4.4)
Each neuron has an arc from every neuron in the previous layer and an arc
to every neuron in the next layer.
Since the neurons have no other connections, the firing activity for
each data pattern can be computed layer-by-layer with increasing k, and
each neuron need only update once for the forward aspect of the propagation
dynamics to converge. This layered graph also allows an error gradient to
be computed for each weight and bias and data point, using the chain rule
to propagate partial derivatives backward from the outputs[21]. Of course,
the activation function must be softened to a sigmoid rather than a hard
threshold, and each signal x ∈ X becomes a vector ofM reals. This softening
does not affect the network’s computational ability[10]. In the equations for
fv (v 6= v
′ and v /∈ L1) below, S(x) is the logistic function. Equation 4.5
computes firing activity and Equation 4.6 computes gradients.
xj = S
(
bv +
∑
i∈Tv
wixi
)
j ∈ Fv (4.5)
yi = wi ·
dS
dx
(
bv +
∑
i∈Tv
wixi
)
·
∑
j∈Fv
yj i ∈ Tv (4.6)
Just like with forward propagation, each neuron need only compute partial
derivatives once. The state space of each hidden neuron Fv (again, v 6= v
′
and v /∈ L1) corresponds one-to-one with R
|Tv|+1 - the space of its input
weights and its bias. The firing activity of each input neuron v ∈ L1 is set by
the environment and does not change. The gradients from v′ are computed
by comparing each xi, i ∈ Tv
′ to a desired firing activity xdi , i ∈ Tv
′ from the
training set. They are then backpropagated using Equation 4.6.
yi = x
d
i − xi i ∈ Tv
′ (4.7)
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This is the gradient of a squared error function:
Err =
1
2
∑
i∈Tv′
y2i (4.8)
The total propagation dynamics Γ1 : FV × X
|E| 7→ X |E| consist of
evaluating Equation 4.5 for each neuron in L1 and then L2 and so on until
LK , at which point v
′ computes error gradients using Equation 4.8, each
neuron in LK computes error gradients from Equation 4.6, LK−1 does the
same, and so on until L2. The input layer L1 has no need of error gradients.
The pattern dynamics ψ1V : FV 7→ FV consist of each neuron greedily
minimizing error by descending the error gradient in (ostensibly) small steps.
The gradient for a bias bv is:
∂Err
∂bv
=
dS
dx
(
bv +
∑
i∈Tv
wixi
)
·
∑
j∈Fv
yj (4.9)
The gradient for a weight we, e ∈ Tv is:
∂Err
∂we
=
∂Err
∂bv
· ye (4.10)
Here is the objective function for each neuron. Again, there are M
data points, and m is an index that selects a data point.
qv = −
∑
m≤M
(∣∣∣∣∂Err∂bv
∣∣∣∣
m
+
∑
i∈Tv
∣∣∣∣∂Err∂we
∣∣∣∣
m
)
v 6= v′ and v /∈ L1 (4.11)
The change in each weight or bias is the product of some step size η > 0 and
the negation of the gradient for that parameter. Unfortunately the gradients
generally become unbounded as they propagate backwards - due to repeated
multiplication by numbers potentially greater than one - so there exists no
Lipschitz constant L that limits the rate of change of each fv. Because the
propagation dynamics are discrete, this violation of Equation 3.1 threatens
the separation between propagation and pattern dynamics. This violation is
usually refered to as the “exploding gradients” problem.
If a weight increases as the pattern dynamics progress, the receiving
neuron becomes more sensitive to the firing of the sending neuron. Since
the weight increased in order to decrease the receiver’s error, weights of the
receiver’s outgoing arcs may increase in turn, as the receiver’s firing activity
has become more valuable. At the same time, the sender becomes more
sensitive to gradients sent back from the receiver. The sender may henceforth
adjust its activity to be of more use the receiver. These relationships are often
crudely summarized as ”Neurons that fire together, wire together.” If these
relationships hold along a walk from the input layer to the output layer, the
corresponding round trip - forward over one graph and backward over the
other - constitutes a feedback loop. A feedback loop becomes a pattern when
the gradients along the loop become zero, which happens at a local minimum
in qv.
Feedback relations in a neural network are difficult to formulate. For
backward signals, y ≺ y′ ⇐⇒
∑
m≤M |y| <
∑
m≤M |y
′|. For the forward
signals in a link e ∈ E, xe ≺ x
′
e iff x
′
e decreases the gradient ye relative to
xe. Unfortunately, there is no way express the forward ordering using only
micro-level information. The effect of a change in firing activity must be
propagated all the way to v′ and back, so the forward ordering would be
recursive and span entire layers of the network. In simple terms: no neuron
actually knows what it wants; it only sees a gradient that points it in a
(hopefully) good direction through Fv. Thus there is no closed-form way to
verify Equation 3.4 for a multilayer perceptron. If there was, I conjecture
that the proof would start from Equation 4.12 - a version of Equation 3.4
modified for two-way cognitive networks like this:
qv
(
xTv\x
′
EC
, yFv\y
′
EC
, xFv\x
′
EC
, yTv\y
′
EC
)
− qv
(
xTv\x
′
EC
, yFv\y
′
EC
, xFv, yTv
)
≥ qv
(
xTv, yFv, xFv\x
′
EC
, yTv\y
′
EC
)
− qv (xTv, yFv, xFv, yTv)
(4.12)
In English, this equation states that the neuron v’s utility becomes more
sensitive to the output signals xFv∩EC and yTv∩EC as the input signals xTv∩EC
and yFv∩EC strengthen. I am not yet sure that Equation 4.12 is properly
formulated. Such a formulation would be core to a formal theory of two-way
cognitive networks.
Not all walks from input to output are feedback loops. A marginal
improvement may not be enough to make the receiver (the one described
above) more valuable than the other neurons in its layer. And the sender’s
increased sensitivity to the receiver’s gradients may not surpass the sender’s
sensitivity to the gradients of other neurons in the receiver’s layer. To identify
the selection of closed walks that undergo positive feedback, Equations 4.5,
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4.6 and 4.7 should be plugged into a feedback condition like Equation 4.12. Of
course, it will be necessary to modify Equations 4.6 and 4.7 so that sensitivity
of the backward signals to the forward signals in a link (on pattern timescales)
could be expressed in closed form. This method of analyzing neural learning
rules could prove quite useful in future work.
Neurons train without any knowledge of the error itself. They only
see the error gradient. By descending that gradient only in small steps, the
weights and biases try to be quasi-static on signaling timescales. Unfortu-
nately, the network runs into trouble here. The gradients in a given layer are
roughly proportional to the weights in layers closer to the exit. Positive feed-
back loops can cause the gradients to increase exponentially - to “explode”
- as the backpropagate. Because the steps taken by the weights and biases
are proportional to the gradient, the pattern dynamics can violate their own
Definition 2.2 and thus the separation between propagation and pattern.
Just like positive feedback leads to exploding gradients, negative feed-
back can lead to “fading” gradients. As I warned at the end of Section
2.3, overly-aggressive contraction can prevent signals from spreading prop-
erly across the network. Also, small gradients lead to only small changes in
weights and biases, eventually halting the pattern dynamics.
Multilayer perceptrons largely try to avoid problems with exploding
and fading gradients by keeping the graph feedforward with few layers. If
each component of the gradient only makes two or three jumps backward,
it can’t grow or shrink much. Gradient descent causes more problems in
networks with many layers, like deep belief networks. The problem is worst
in recurrent networks, which have directed cycles. A signal in a recurrent
network may make an infinite number of jumps. If the gradients explode,
then the propagation dynamics of such a network will never converge, and
without convergence, the aggregation p does not exist. A gentle fading will
make the propagation dynamics contract, but excessive fading still prevents
signal propagation.
In contrast, the forward signals do contract. Although I will not
prove this statement, Hopfield provided good inductive evidence[9] that the
propagation of firing activity mostly converges. Intuitively, a neuron rejects
any changes in its input that do not push it over its threshold - from inactive
to firing or vice versa.
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4.3 Market Economies
Most naturally-occuring cognitive networks are composed of, inter-
twined with and assemble into other cognitive networks. Modeling such
systems is tricky and intellectually risky. The modeler must pick and choose
what to represent, and any omissions are bound to be criticized by those
with different priorities. In this section, I run a greater risk than most: I am
not an economist. Remember that my purpose is to explain cognition, not
the finer points of economics. The broad pattern of an economy will suffice.
Among the many contexts in which it can be understood, I will model the
specialization of market niches and the relationships between them. I will
try to describe how niches develop and coordinate to best acquire, process
and allocate resources.
Every model defines a context within the heterarchy of cognitive net-
works - the heterarchy that extends from individual cells to the biosphere.
A theory of cognition can guide the creation of models and render them in a
common language, enabling us to draw clearer lines between contexts and to
avoid using a model outside its context. The content of signals in the model
circumscribes what it can cognize, and the choice of agents determines the
model’s granularity. A consequence of acausality is that even a good model
may not predict which patterns emerge in its referent. That does not, how-
ever, mean the model is useless. The model might still predict what kinds of
pattern can emerge, as well as the stability or coherence of patterns which
have already emerged. In other words, the model might still predict what
can be known or is likely to be known.
Each niche is an agent characterized by:
• a product
• the producers of that product
• the method of production
The market economy is a two-way cognitive network. Goods and services are
the forward signals while money and preferences are the backward signals.
By transforming goods and services into other goods and services, niches
(as agents) collectively bridge the available resources to consumer demand.
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Those available resources are the entry vertices. Consumers are the exit
vertices.
The propagation dynamics are the process by which the market works
out the price of each good and the volume bought by each receiving niche.
The niches are quasi-static, which is to say the products, sets of producers and
the methods of production are all fixed on short timescales. This limits each
niche’s flexibility. Say, for instance, that the demand for a good increases.
At some point the increase will test the capacity of the producing niche. The
price will rise, decreasing demand. Conversely, a drop in demand will cause a
drop in price, which raises demand. This negative feedback - driven by profit
and limits on flexibility - ensures that the propagation dynamics converge.
The pattern dynamics are the adaptation of goods to fit buyer pref-
erences and the adaptation of the means of production to fit the available
resources. Producers can leave or join niches, or they may invest in or liq-
uidate means of production. There are two kinds of positive feedback. The
first - analagous to autocatalytic loops - occurs when a supply chain produces
some of its own means of production. The second comes from economies of
scale and is analagous to the feedback loops in a multi-layer perceptron. For
many goods, the more that gets produced, the easier it is to produce. The
easier a good is to produce, the more profit that can be made, which draws
more people and companies to produce that good. This kind of feedback loop
is a supply chain from raw material to consumer. Like the feedback loops in
an ANN, the backward walk mirrors the forward walk.
In general, goods in a supply chain have uses both inside and outside
the supply chain. As positive feedback progresses, those goods will become
more suited to their use inside the supply chain as opposed to outside it. If
the graph can change over time, niches will split and differentiate to take
advantage of their own economies of scale.2 In this way, the supply chain
may become an industry.
Like any model, this one leaves a lot of interesting behavior out of
context. Here is a short, non-exhaustive list.
• Modeling niches as agents ignores the differences between large com-
panies, small businesses and individuals.
2I have not yet addressed changes to the graph, but such a study would make for
fascinating future work.
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• Modeling the physical environment as the entry ignores environmental
damage.
• Treating the consumer as the exit node omits anything that alters con-
sumer demand, like culture or advertising.
I have also left out the precise definition of a good. The simplest definition is
the set of uses for the good. To model uncertainty - e.g. risk or asymmetries
in information - I could make every signal a probability distribution over
the power set of possible uses for a good.3 That still leaves out temporal
behavior, like borrowing money or training the workforce. To model those,
each good would become a function of its uses over a cycle in time.
That should suffice for an example of cognition. The rest, I will leave
to economists.
4.4 Ant Colony Optimization
Ant colony optimization (ACO) is a class of algorithms for finding a
“short” path from one vertex in a graph to another[4]. It may seem very
specialized, but many combinatoric optimization problems can be expressed
as such a path search. ACO works by imitating the method by which ants
settle on a path between their colony and a food source. Some number of ants
start at the colony and wander through a graph of waypoints, guided toward
the food by smell (a search heuristic). After they reach the food, they retrace
their steps back to the colony, laying pheremone uniformly along their path.
Each ant has a fixed amount of pheremone to lay, so it will lay pheremone
more densely on shorter paths. Ants that walk the graph thereafter will favor
arcs4 with more pheremone. When these ants lay their pheremones in turn,
they will tend to lay it on these arcs, which will draw more ants. As time
goes on, the ants settle on a single short path through the graph, and this
path maps to a solution of the combinatoric optimization problem.
An ACO is a two-way cognitive network in which the waypoints are the
agents. An agent also includes the pheremone concentrations of its outgoing
arcs. The location of the colony is the entry vertex, and the location of the
food source is the exit vertex. The forward signal in an arc is a probability
3Similar to Eigen and Schuster’s treatment of genetic risk[5].
4or edges, in the undirected case
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distribution over all the forward walks an ant could take from the entry vertex
through that arc (before reaching the exit). The backward signal is the same
but from the exit vertex and over the backward graph. These walks are not
uniformly random; ants are guided first by the search heuristic and then by
pheremone concentrations.5 The heuristic - the smell of food - has a fixed
value for each arc. When a single ant walks randomly across the graph, it
samples a probability distribution for each arc in its path.
The propagation dynamics consist of ants walking across the network
while the pheremone concentrations are quasi-static. That condition can
be achieved by keeping each ant’s pheremone payload small compared to
the ants’ ability to smell. Most implementations pass a population of ants
through the network before laying all their pheremones at once, but this
is more a matter of convenience than functionality. More important is the
impracticality of covering the entire support of every path distribution. We
cannot say the propagation dynamics have converged until individual ants
cease to shift the colony’s estimate of these distributions. But every path
would need to be traversed by at least one ant, and the point of ACO is
to be faster than simply trying all the paths. That contradiction sounds
catastrophic, yet ACO works. Why?
It works because ACO need not maintain perfect separation between
propagation and pattern dynamics. Relaxing separation makes the pattern
dynamics stochastic with an increasing variance. That stochasticity doesn’t
cripple the algorithm because there are usually many good paths. ACO does
try to improve separation by keeping the number of likely paths small. First,
it prohibits ants from revisiting a vertex before reaching the exit. Second,
the search heuristic attracts the ants to a smaller set of paths, concentrating
their probability mass on a subset of its support. Finally, positive feedback
helps minimize the number of likely paths. As time proceeds, a subset of
paths comes to dominate the rest, and then a subset of that subset, and so
on. This serves to shrink the effective support of the path distributions. The
result of these steps is an algorithm that reaches a good solution quickly. For
very hard problems, this is often better than taking a long time to find the
best solution.
The pattern dynamics are the process by which pheremone is laid.
5Some instances of ACO don’t use a heuristic. Before pheremones are laid, the ants in
those colonies do make uniformly random pathing choices.
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Having already described the process from the ants’ perspective, here is the
waypoints’ perspective as agents. An agent maximizes the number of ants
on the outgoing arc with the most ants.6 If an agent increases the number
of ants it sends along the (expected) shortest path, the expected path length
of its ants will decrease. That gives the waypoints from which it receives
ants reason to favor it, because they have the same incentive. By this rea-
soning, the shortest walk through the graph should coincide with the sole
feedback loop. The catch is that pheremone concentration is similar but not
identical to the inverse of expected path length. At a certain point in the
feedback, when pheremones have become concentrated enough, the ants will
choose well-worn paths simply because they are well-worn. Like with many
stochastic optimization algorithms, one must balance speed of convergence
with the quality of the solution.
Pheremones evaporate at a rate proportional to their concentration.
Even if all the ants choose the same path, eventually the rate at which those
ants lay pheremone equals the evaporation rate. The evaporation rate is not
necessary for a feedback loop to become a pattern - that loop stabilized as
soon as its pheremone levels got high enough that nearly all the ants chose
it. Evaporation is necessary if one wishes ants to explore after a pattern
emerges. Such exploration is only useful if the algorithm is elitist7; otherwise
the other ants will ignore any new paths an explorer finds. Elitism involves
computation external to the network, so it has no analog in a cognitive
network.
Unlike the other exemplars I’ve introduced, ant colonies primarily
cognize themselves. Ants enter the network without external information.
Instead, the information encoded in a pattern reflects only the graph, the
lengths of the arcs, the search heuristic and the random choices of the earliest
ants.
Waypoints are not usually seen as agents; the ants are. These ant-
agents come to an explicit consensus on the best path. ACO occupies a
curious middle ground between cognitive networks and consensus algorithms.
This dual interpretation possible only because feedback in ACO is winner-
take-all. Seeing it as a consensus algorithm, each agent must know the whole
pattern. Seeing it as a cognitive network, the set of possible patterns is very
6This does not mean sending all ants over the same arc as soon as that arc becomes
popular; such a shift would be a discontinuous jump through the agent’s state space.
7An elitist algorithm always selects and remembers the best solution found so far.
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restricted. These two apparent problems seem to offset each other.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
I have now outlined a new formal theory of cognition. It is does not
focus on humans, on artificial intelligence or on any other specific domain.
Instead, it lays out the abstract process by which a complex network acquires
knowledge. My theory is still limited to fixed graphs1 with two levels - micro
and macro. A complete theory should describe the dynamics of the graph
and explain how an arbitrary number of levels interact when arranged in a
heterarchy.
5.1 Context in Cognition
A cognitive system is a network of agents. These agents signal
each other on relatively short timescales and change their state over longer
timescales. For every configuration of agent states, the signal propagation
dynamics find a stable fixed point, called the aggregate. Since signals prop-
agate faster than the agents move, the propagation dynamics closely track
this fixed point, which means the agents react only to the aggregate. In
the pattern dynamics, each agent maximizes a utility function of its input
and output signals. This behavior may lead subsets of agents coordinate
across closed walks through the graph by reinforcing their signals to each
other. A stronger signal over any arc in the walk causes the receiving agent
to strengthen the signal it sends over the next arc. Eventually this wave
1where the signals or agents states move but not the vertex or arc sets
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of influence returns to strengthen the first signal further, and the closed
walk becomes a feedback loop. If the signals in a feedback loop stablize, the
feedback loop becomes a pattern. The selection of closed walks that undergo
feedback and then stabilize into patterns, together with the nature of the
signals in the pattern, encode the network’s knowledge. Despite being ad
hoc and of arbitrary scale, these encodings are coherent.
So far, I have mostly avoided the use of “complex” and “simple”
as adjectives, because they are only useful in a relative sense. Recall the
(biological) ant colony I sketched on page one. If I modeled the colony,
I would probably say that each ant is “simple”. Yet an ant is incredibly
complex in its own right. Its brain is a cognitive network of cells, and those
cells are cognitive networks of molecules. Retreating to the perspective of an
ecosystem, the colony itself looks like a simple agent. Every cognitive system
operates in some context or set of contexts.
A context is defined by a σ-algebra on a set of things that can
be known in that context.
A context can be very broad but never universal. Billy Vaughn Koen
would say that all knowledge is heuristic, in that it “provides a plausible
aid or direction in the solution of a problem but is in the final analysis
unjustified, incapable of justification, and potentially fallible.”[12] Since any
unit of knowledge is part of some contexts but not others, it follows that
objective knowledge is a contradiction. It also follows that knowledge can
only be measured relative to a given context, with that context being the
domain of the measure. Since no context exists which includes all possible
knowledge, no objective measure of knowledge exists.
Similar reasoning applies to measures of “complexity”. As a field,
we have been asking how complex behavior arises from simple parts. But
without an objective notion of complexity, this question loses its meaning.
I will reframe it. By saying that an agent is simple, I am saying that its
context includes the signals it receives (and sends) but not the whole network.
Likewise, the network sees an agent’s output signals but not the potentially-
complex argmax problem an agent solves internally. Thus an agent is both
simple and complex relative to the whole network, and the whole network
is both simple and complex with respect to each agent. Every cognitive
process implies one or more contexts. Each context is a σ-algebra of things
the cognitive system can know.
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Figure 5.1: On the left: A single monolithic context divided into micro con-
texts. In the center: Overlapping micro (thin) and macro (bold) contexts
in a cognitive network. Parts of each context are shared, and others are
hidden. On the right: The micro contexts have subsumed the macro con-
text. This could involve a centralized aggregation procedure (as opposed to
a propagation dynamics) or an algorithm for the explicit consensus of agents.
The paradox of “complex behavior from simple parts” comes from
thinking about a cognitive network in only one context at a time. By consid-
ering agents in their own micro-level contexts, I have reframed our question:
How do the micro and macro contexts of a cognitive network relate to each
other? The macro context consists of feedback loops and patterns, and each
micro context consists of an individual agent’s utility maximization problem.
My theory links these contexts by means of the aggregation (recall Definition
2.4) and of complementarity between agent utility functions. This framework
begins to explain - formally - how a consciousness relates to the substrate
from which it emerges.
The field of cybernetics tried to explain cognition qualitatively. Mat-
urana and Varela, for example, introduced the concept of autopoiesis, or
self-creation, in living systems[20]. Douglas Hofstadter introduced strange
loops, which are configurations of symbols that take on circular meaning,
thereby becoming self-aware[8]. Unfortunately, cybernetics researchers were
only able to express their ideas with words rather than with mathematics.
While their work fascinated many, none could agree on what it meant or
how it should be applied. We need formality if we are to reliably convey our
understanding of cognition from mind to mind.
Most other work on cognition falls into one of two categories. The
first is a top-down approach that focuses more on what a cognitive system
does than how it cognizes. Psychology falls into this category, and so does
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the study of symbolic artificial intelligence. This approach struggles with
context. Psychological studies are difficult to control because human thought
takes place in many contexts, and those contexts are very hard to ascertain
or control. A well-controlled study may yield clear quantitative results, but
those results only apply in the narrow context created for the study. In
artificial intelligence, Alan Newell[16] framed cognition as a rational, goal-
oriented search through a problem space. But a well-posed search calls for
a well-defined goal, which cannot be defined a priori for a whole cognitive
network. And rationality - being an application of knowledge - is just as
context-dependent as the knowledge itself. Unfortunately, the context for all
known artificial intelligences must either be specified by a human designer or
generated by an algorithm written by a human designer. The context(s) of
such a system will always be circumscribed, and the system will always face
an intractable and ill-defined meta-problem - figuring out when its knowledge
is or is not useful. A top-down approach requires a clear context that doesn’t
often exist.
The second category is characterized by a bottom-up approach which
seeks the micro-level mechanics of cognition. This kind of cognitive architec-
ture adapts to the context it finds itself in. Artifical neural networks are a
good example, as are Pentti Kanerva’s sparse distributed memories[11]. Neu-
roscience searches for the mechanics of human (or animal) cognition. Like
cybernetics, work in this category asks how something learns. But where
cybernetics tends to be informal and abstract, bottom-up approaches are
formal and concrete. Every cognitive architecture modeled with a bottom-
up approach either arose by itself or explicitly mimicks a system that did.
Until now, no one has been able extract or abstract the essence of cognition
for novel use in other systems.
My goal has been a formal, abstract theory of cognition that deals
properly with context. Like the bottom-up approach, I have sought formal
mechanics of cognition. Like cybernetics, I have tried to keep those mechan-
ics abstract. At the end of Section 3.1, I pointed out that the usual tradeoffs
between agents and the macro-level - a) agent simplicity versus the process-
ing of macro-level information and b) agent simplicity versus the storage
of macro-level information - could be two aspects of the same fundamental
paradox. That paradox is how complex behavior arises from simple parts.
I resolved it by finding a better question: Where do the micro and macro
contexts overlap, and where do they not? By treating signal propagation as
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a dynamical system unto itself, the micro-level contexts aggregate the macro
context without subsuming it. By defining pattern in terms of closed walks
of complementarity between agents, the micro-level contexts coordinate to
store information in the macro context while remaining distinct from the
macro context.
5.2 Future Work
Almost every aspect of my theory could be developed further.
Regarding aggregation, I have not yet explained what information
propagates and what doesn’t. Abstract algebra may provide the proper tools
to model and control the spread of signals, given how they join and split at
each agent. If signals can be measured, ergodic theory may also be useful.
Two-way networks deserve a formal definition and analysis. How do
forwards and backward signals interact? What, precisely, constitutes a feed-
back loop through a pair of mirrored graphs? Such work will allow us to
apply the mathematics of cognition to a much wider range of systems.
The topology of the pattern dynamics is still fairly mysterious. How
robust are patterns, and what kinds of robustness are there? Can patterns
merge or split, and how do these events affect their coherence? Can parts of
a coherent pattern survive if the pattern loses stability? These questions are
fundamental to the design of cognitive networks.
Even though most natural cognitive networks are related heterarchi-
cally, my theory analyzes only two levels of behavior at a time - a micro-level
and a macro-level. Can a formal definition of context allows us to model the
relationships between many contexts? An answer to this question is vital for
modeling natural systems.
How does the graph of a cognitive network change over time without
interfering with separation or breaking feedback loops? In particular, how
can an agent create new arcs when its context is limited to the arcs it already
has? This question is very pertinent to artificial neural networks as well as
to design automation.
Finally, there’s a lot of application work to do. Cognition can help
design new metaheuristics for optimization, and it might provide a better
understanding of the ones we already have - genetic algorithms, ACO and
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particle swarms in particular. New ways to train and structure artificial
neural networks should present themselves. And finally, it should be possible
to improve the distributed control of large industrial systems like smart grids
and reconfigurable manufacturing systems.
Many of these applications will inevitably inform the more abstract
inquiries, just like the systems in Chapter 4 guided me to the theory in
Chapters 2 and 3. The social and biological sciences could be a fertile ground
for new quantitative models, although we will probably need a formal theory
of context in order to comprehensively model market economies or ecologies.
A better understanding of context could likewise provide a formal language
for comparing and contrasting cognitive architectures.
Curiosity aside, we should be cautious about modeling social systems.
As we study them, we must remember that social theories can affect their
referents if or when they become public knowledge. These observer effects
can be unpredictable or even dangerous. Given the training necessary to fully
understand theories of cognition, these theories are unlikely to find their way
(intact) into the public consciousness. Rogue, poorly applied social theories
have in the past created much upheaval.
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